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Elias-Zacariasv. INS: Neutrality as a Form of
Political Opinion
I. Introduction
Guatemalans were fleeing violence in their war-torn country
long before the armed, masked men came to Jairo Jonathan EliasZacarias one evening in 1987. In fact, the battle between the military
and the guerrillas would displace more than one million
Guatemalans inside the country by the end of that year and force
tens of thousands of others to run to Mexico or the United States.'
These people fled for good reason: between 1954 and 1988, more
than one hundred thousand Guatemalan civilians were arbitrarily
killed by the government (more than half of those between 1978 and
1988) and countless more (thirty-five thousand between 1978 and
2
1988 alone) were "disappeared."
So when the Elias-Zacarias family saw the men lurking in the
dusk near their home, they knew they were in danger.3 And when
the guerrillas approached and asked the young man and his father to
join them, the family knew the time had come for 18-year-old Jairo
Jonathan to come to grips with his country's civil war.4 Instead of
choosing a side, however, he did what many before him had done:
he fled the country. 5 His parents urged him to run to the United
States, 6 but when he entered this country in July of 1987, agents for
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) apprehended him
the same day he crossed the border. 7 For five years, Elias-Zacarias
fought deportation, arguing both to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit that conditions in his homeland were such that he might be
killed for his political beliefs if he returned.8 He argued that guerrillas threatened his life for trying to remain neutral in their war against
I Warren Holleman, The Human Rights Illusion, 159 AM. 318, 318 (1988).
2 Id. See infra note 31.
3 Respondent's Brief at 2, INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S.Ct. 812 (1992) (No. 901342)[herinafter Resp't Br.]
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 The BIA dismissed Elias-Zacarias' first appeal on procedural grounds. The Board
denied his motion to re-open, but addressed the merits of his case. The BIA concluded
that there was no evidence that the guerrillas engaged in forced recruitment and that Elias-
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the Guatemalan government. 9
Elias-Zacarias' fight to stay in this country ended in 1992 when
the United States Supreme Court ruled against him, saying that he
had failed to show that the guerrillas were persecuting him on account of his political opinion and that he was therefore ineligible for
asylum.10
Elias-Zacarias' fate depended on a statute enacted by Congress
to inject humanitarian principles into this country's immigration policy. The Refugee Act of 1980"1 was to give "statutory meaning to
our national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns."' 12 Congress wanted to create an immigration policy that
would reflect this country's commitment to caring for people who
looked to the United States as a "safe haven."' 3 Unfortunately for
Elias-Zacarias, the Supreme Court refused to take a humanitarian approach to his case.
This Note analyzes the Court's holding in INS v. Elias-Zacarias
and concludes that, in addition to being unrealistic, the Court's decision was contrary to Congressional intent for two reasons: First, the
ruling perpetuates the discrimination that Congress was trying to
eliminate from this country's immigration policy when it enacted the
Refugee Act; and second, the Court's ruling does not reflect the
human rights ideal that was a driving force behind the Refugee
Act. 14 This Note surveys the background law by focusing on the dispute between the BIA and the Ninth Circuit over how to deal with
forced recruitment and neutrality cases.' 5 This Note concludes that
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, and not that of the Supreme Court or
16
the BIA, best reflects the purpose of the Refugee Act.
Zacarias had not proved the existence of any threats. Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 851
(9th Cir. 1990).
The Ninth Circuit overruled the BIA, finding that the guerrillas did engage in forced
recruitment and that they had threatened Elias-Zacarias. For these reasons, the court held
that Elias-Zacarias qualified as a refugee under the Refugee Act. Id.
9 Resp't Br., supra note 3, at 2.
10 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992).

I 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (Supp. 1 1990) [hereinafter the Refugee Act].
12 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101, 94 Stat. 101, 102 (codified as

CongressionalDeclaration of Policies and Objectives, 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (1988)); S. REP. No. 256,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 141 [hereinafter Senate
Report].
13 Senate Report, supra note 12, at 142.

14 See infra notes 174-75 and accompaning text.
15 The Ninth Circuit hears an unusually large number of immigration cases because
of demographics (California is believed to have the largest undocumented alien population of any state) and the presence of a major Immigration and Naturalization detention
center. Carolyn P. Blum, The Ninth Circuitand the Protection of Asylum Seekers Since the Passage
of the Refugee Act of 1980, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 327, 329 n. 10 (1986).
16 See infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
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II. INS v. Elias-Zacarias
A.

Background

Guatemala's political and cultural woes go back more than fourhundred years.1 7 The ancestors of the Guatemalan Indians were the
Mayans. Before the Conquistador invasion in 1524, they enjoyed an
advanced civilization.' 8 Since that time, however, the natives of Guatemala have been dominated by the Ladinos (people who are of
mixed or pure Spanish descent). 19
Until 1944, the country was run by dictators. 20 In that year, a
reformist Ladino coalition established a democratic government with
free elections, free speech, and a free press. 2 1 This lasted until 1954,
when the U.S. Government arranged to overthrow the elected president. 22 The military took over and ruled for more than thirty years
an era of terror marked by hundreds of thousands of killings and
disappearances and reports of torture. 23 Between 1982 and 1983,
the army burned at least one village per week; during the late 1980s,
the army destroyed 444 villages. 24 In 1986, the military restored the
civilian government. 2 5 In doing so, however, the military did not
give up its hold on power. As then-President Mario Vinicio Cerezo
Arevalo said at his inaugural address, "I remind you that I have re26
ceived the government, but not the power."
The government now seeks some kind of accord with the leftwing guerrillas, but it is unlikely that any progress will be made until
the human rights abuses stop. 27 For now, such a possibility seems
28
remote because the military's human rights violations continue.
B.

Facts of the case

Just before dark in January 1987, Elias-Zacarias' parents saw two

men with machine guns lurking near their home. 29 The men eventu17 Holleman, supra note 1,at 319.
18 The Guatemala of today can hardly be called such. The army tortures and terrorizes the Indians. Health workers are kidnapped, tortured and killed. Nearly half the population is unemployed or underemployed. More than 30,000 children die of hunger related
causes each year - 4/5 of all Guatemalan children are malnourished. In rural areas, the
life expectancy is 41, and more than 25 percent of all Guatemalan children die before their
fifth birthday. Holleman, supra note 1, at 319.
19 Holleman, supra note 1, at 319.
20 Holleman, supra note 1,at 319.
21 Holleman, supra note 1,at 319.
22 Where the War Still Looks Cold, 322 ECONOMIST 36 (1992).
23 Holleman, supra note 1,at 318.
24 Holleman, supra note 1,at 318.
25 Holleman, supra note 1, at 319.
26 Holleman, supra note 1,at 320.
27 Lucy Hood, Susan V. Lawrence, & Gerson Yalowitz, Show-me Time for Guatemala's
New President, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 21, 1991, at 32, 32.
28 Id.

29 Resp't Br., sup-a note 3,at 2.
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ally approached.3 0 Although they had handkerchiefs covering their
faces, they identified themselves as guerrillas and asked EliasZacarias and his parents to join them in their war against the government. 3 ' The family refused. Elias-Zacarias explained his family's
fear: "[I]fyoujoin the guerrillas ... then you are against the government. You are against the government and if you join them then it is
to die there. And, then the government is against you and against
your family." '3 2 The guerrillas promised to return, and Elias-Zacarias
concluded that they would "take me and kill me" if he remained3neu4
tral. 3 3 Seeing no solution to his dilemma, he fled the country.
The INS apprehended Elias-Zacarias the same day he entered
the United States near Nogales, Arizona. 3 5 Agents placed him in detention and initiated deportation proceedings.3 6 Elias-Zacarias acknowledged his deportability, but requested that his deportation be
withheld.3 7 He claimed he was a refugee within the meaning of the
Refugee Act and was therefore eligible for political asylum. 3 8 In order to qualify for refugee status, Elias-Zacarias had to show that he
had a well-founded fear of persecution because of his political
beliefs.S9
C. Holding
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the guerrillas'
30 Resp't Br., supra note 3, at 2.
31 In oral argument before the Ninth Circuit, the INS lawyer speculated that the guerrillas wore handkerchiefs, not to hide their faces, but "because it might have been dusty
that day." In his opinion, Judge Fletcher called such speculation "wholly unwarranted."
Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 852 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990).
32 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 819 n.5 (1992) (Stevens,J., dissenting). EliasZacarias' fear of government retaliation was not unfounded. The government's response
to the guerrillas has been
a shift towards militarization and aggressive anti-guerrilla campaigns. These
campaigns [have been] accompanied by massive human rights violations, and
the blatant activities of Death Squads. . . .In August 1982, the Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances of the United Nations
named Guatemala among 22 countries where it had found that 'disappearances' 'served as a euphemism for terror campaigns often led by police, military, or paramilitary forces.' The report said that: 'The victims are either
never heard of again, reappear bearing the scars of torture; or are found
dead, often with their bodies mutilated beyond recognition.'
Carmen Carrillo, The Application of Refugee Laws to Central.Americansin the UnitedStates, 9 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 4 (1989).

33 Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 817 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34 More than half a million people from Guatemala and El Salvador have fled to
Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, the United States and Canada. Unlike immigrants from
other countries, these people do not seek opportunity from their new homes; they seek
relief from repression and torture. Carrillo, supra note 32, at 2-3.
35 Resp't Br., supra note 3, at 2.
36 Resp't Br., supra note 3, at 2.
37 Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1990).
38 The Refugee Act is the first statute that expressly gives aliens the right to apply for
asylum in the United States. Blum, supra note 15, at 330.
39 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S.Ct. 812, 815 (1992).
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threats constituted "persecution on account of . . . political opinion."40 In a 6-3 decision, the Court concluded that they did not. 41
The Court's reasoning was simple: Not only had Elias-Zacarias failed
to show any political motivation for his own actions, but he also
failed to show that the guerrillas threatened him specifically because
of his political beliefs.4 2 Because there was no evidence that EliasZacarias' politics had anything to do with his refusal to join the guerrillas or with their3 threats against him, the Court could not grant him
4
political asylum.
In an opinion written byJustice Scalia, the Court found that the
record showed only that Elias-Zacarias was afraid - and nothing
more. 4 4 He had refused the guerrillas, not because he disagreed
with them, but because he feared government retaliation. 4 5 There
were no politics involved. The Court seemed to view Elias-Zacarias
as just one of many Guatemalans who did not want to become enmeshed in the country's bloody civil war, something that was potentially lethal regardless of the victim's political bent.4 6

"Even a

person who supports a guerrilla movement might resist recruitment
for a variety of reasons," the Court said. 4 7 "IF]ear of combat, a
desire to remain with one's family and friends, a desire to earn a
better living in civilian life, to mention only a few." 48 Unfortunately
how well-founded for Elias-Zacarias, fear on its own - no matter
49
is not enough to support an asylum claim.
The Court then rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that, regardless of Elias-Zacarias' reasons, the guerrillas' motive in recruiting him was political, thus satisfying the Refugee Act's test.50 In
discounting the circuit court's reasoning, Justice Scalia wrote that the
statute addresses "persecution on account of the victim's political
40 Id. at 816.
41 Id.
42 Id.

43 Id. The Ninth Circuit barely addressed the issue of political opinion, dispensing
with the question in one sentence:
[T]he threat to Elias was for political as opposed to personal reasons; the
[BIA] did not suggest that the individual guerrillas who appeared at his door
had a personal quarrel with Elias, and in any event, there is no evidence to
rebut the common sense presumption that the guerrillas were interested in
recruiting Elias to further the group's political goals.
Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 852 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original).
44 Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. at 816.
45 Id.
46 Id.

47 Id. at 815.16.
48 Id. at 816. But see Resp't Br., supra note 3, at 6 ("This case is not about displaced
persons fleeing from general conditions of civil strife in a war-torn country. This is a case
about one individual - Jairo Jonathan Elias-Zacarias - who had a political opinion, who
acted on it, and who fears that if he returns home he will be taken and killed because of his
politically-motivated act.").
49 See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
50 Elias-Zacarias, 112 S.Ct. at 816.
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opinion, not the persecutor's.... Thus, the mere existence of a generalized 'political' motive underlying the guerrillas' forced recruitment is inadequate to establish . . . the proposition that Elias-

Zacarias fears persecution on account of political opinion." 5 1
The Court found troubling the lack of affirmative action taken
by Elias-Zacarias. 52 The guerrillas were angry with him, not because
of something he had done, but because of something he had not
done. 53 This defeated Elias-Zacrias' claim because neutrality
is not
"ordinarily" an affirmative expression of political opinion.5 4
Most important to the Court's holding, however, was that EliasZacarias failed to show that the guerrillas were doing anything more
than trying to fill their ranks. 55 If Elias-Zacarias' own affirmatively
expressed political beliefs were not at the root of the guerrillas' anger, then asylum could not be granted. 5 6 The persecutor's motive,
the Court said, is critical. 5 7 A person seeking asylum must show
some link between the guerrillas' intent and his political opinion,
58
whether by direct or circumstantial evidence, in order to win.
The dissent sharply criticized the majority for its "narrow" and
"grudging" view of political opinion under the act. 5 9 Justice Ste-

vens' dissenting opinion was unequivocal in concluding that neutrality can indeed be an expression of a person's political views. 60 "A
political opinion can be expressed negatively as well as affirmatively," he wrote in an opinion joined by Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor. 6 1 "A refusal to support a cause - by staying home on
election day, by refusing to take an oath of allegiance, or by refusing
to step forward at an induction center - can express a political opinion as effectively as an affirmative statement or affirmative
62
conduct."
The implication that a victim had to choose sides in a war in
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.

55 Id.
56 Id. The dissent takes the contrary view. "It does not matter to the persecutors
what the individual's motivation is. The guerrillas ... do not inquire into the reasoning
process of those who insist on remaining neutral and refuse to join their cause." Id. at 819

(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1287 (9th
Cir. 1985)).
57 Id. at 817.

58 Id. The dissent disagrees with this, saying that the victim does not have to prove
why his persecutors are after him, only that he has a "well-founded fear of persecution on
account of ... political opinion." Id. at 820 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[T]he applicant
meets this burden if he shows that there is a 'reasonable possibility' that he will be persecuted on account of his political opinion." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 818 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

60 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61 Id. (StevensJ., dissenting).
62 Id. (StevensJ., dissenting).
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order to qualify for asylum under the Refugee Act troubled the dissenters. 63 "A rule that one must identify with one of two dominant
warring political factions in order to possess a political opinion,
when many persons may, in fact, be opposed to the views and policies of both, would frustrate one of the basic objectives of the Refugee Act of 1980 - to provide protection to all victims of persecution
regardless of ideology."64
The dissent acknowledged that fear motivated Elias-Zacarias,
but regarded this fear as irrelevant. 6 5 The fear behind EliasZacarias' opinions did not make those opinions any less political.
"Even if the refusal is motivated by nothing more than a simple desire to continue living an ordinary life with one's family," Stevens
wrote, "it is the kind of political expression that the asylum provisions of the statute were intended to protect." 66 Stevens urged flexibility when interpreting the Refugee Act and said that any doubts
should be resolved in favor of the person seeking asylum. 67 He
noted that calling Elias-Zacarias a refugee would not open the immigration flood gates, for the final 68determination of asylum would still
be left to the Attorney General.
Background law

II.

A.

The Refugee Act of 1980

Prior to 1980, the United States' refugee law was stuck in time.
This country's immigration policy was designed for the post-World
War II world when people from Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and oppressive regimes in the Middle East fled to the United
States. 69 By 1980, this policy of the early Cold War was thought to
be outdated and unfair. As Senator Edward Kennedy remarked:
The refugees of tomorrow, like the refugees of today, will continue

to look to the United States for safe haven and resettlement opportunities - and our Government will continue to be called upon to
help. Yet all agree that the present law and practice is inadequate,
and that the piecemeal approach of our Government in reacting
70 to
individual refugee crises as they occur is no longer tolerable.
Congress responded with the Refugee Act, 7 1 which eliminates

discriminatory restrictions. The Refugee Act "implements an ideologically and geographically neutral policy toward refugees, amend63 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

64 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277,
1286 (9th Cir. 1985)).
65 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67

Id. at 820 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

68 Id. at 818-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69 Senate Report, supra note 12, at 144.
70 Senate Report, supra note 12, at 143.
71 Refugee Act, supra note 11.
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ing language in the Immigration and Nationality Act that granted
refugee status solely to persons fleeing communist or Middle Eastern
regimes."' 72 The Act's drafters intended to create a humanitarian
policy that underscored the country's commitment to human
rights. 73 The Refugee Act governs procedures for delaying deportation and for granting asylum. Congress redefined "refugee," hoping
the new definition would recognize "the plight of homeless people
74
all over the world."
A refugee is any person who faces persecution "on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion."7 5 The victim must establish that he or she has
76
suffered persecution or has a "well-founded" fear of persecution.
As one commentator explained: "Congress intended the term 'refugee' to include all persecuted, homeless, and defenseless persons
who flee harsh, tyrannical, or oppressive regimes. Political detainees
and prisoners of conscience are also considered refugees."' 77 The
Attorney General must halt the deportation of any alien who establishes refugee status. 78 This is mandatory. Once this has been
shown, the refugee may then request asylum. 79 Unlike the deportation, however, the grant of asylum is discretionary.8 0 The Attorney
General may deny the request, even if the refugee has shown the
81
requisite fear.
These types of claims are heard through the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, which consists of immigration judges and the
BIA.82 The immigration judges have jurisdiction over the asylum

applications and are required to request an advisory opinion from
the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs of the Department of State after each claim has been filed.83 If ajudge denies

a claim, the refugee can appeal to the BIA. 84 If the BIA dismisses the
appeal, the refugee can then take his case to the United States Court
72 Linda Dale Bevis, Comment, "Political Opinions" of Refugees: InterpretingInternational
Sources, 63 WASH. L. REV. 395, 397 (1988).
73 Senate Report, supra note 12, at 141.
74 Senate Report, supra note 12, at 142.

75 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
76 Id.
77 Bevis, supra note 72, at 397.
78 Mark R. von Sternberg, Emerging Bases of "Persecution" in American Refugee Law: Political Opinion and the Dilemma of Neutrality, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1, 2 n.9 (1989).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See generally Carrillo, supra note 32, at 10-11 (discussing the treatment of Central
Americans in the Refugee Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act). Carrillo notes
that the Attorney General has denied 97% of asylum applications from Central America.
Id. at 3.
82 von Sternberg, supra note 78, at 2 n.9.
83 von Sternberg, supra note 78, at 2 n.9.
84 von Sternberg, supra note 78, at 2 n.9.
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85
of Appeals in that jurisdiction.

B.

The Ninth Circuit and the BIA

The Refugee Act poses special problems when an alien seeks
asylum from a country in the midst of civil war or revolution, for in
such places, everyone's life is overshadowed by danger. A generalized fear of violence, however, will not make someone a refugee
under the Act. 8 6 No matter how real or dangerous or appalling the
threat of violence might be, the victim who cannot tie it into one of
the act's five categories - political opinion, race, religion, nationality, or social group - is not a refugee under the Act. People seeking
asylum must show that they are somehow special - that they have
88
been "singled out." '87 Mere -victimization is not enough.
The circuit courts and the BIA have long struggled with cases
involving an asylum seeker who can show no overt manifestation of
political opinion, such as membership in an organization or participation in protests. Neutrality, it seems, is a very tricky issue. In such
cases, there is no affirmative act on which to hang a decision - no
bright line to show exactly why the victim has been targeted. Commentator Mark R. von Sternberg described the dilemma this way:
"The distinction between the passive victim of violence and the actual proponent of political value inviting persecution becomes extremely difficult to draw. At what point, the cases ask, does mute
suffering at the hands of an oppressor become active resistance and
thus assume the mantle of political opinion."8 9
This dilemma has caused division between the Ninth Circuit and
the BIA. 90 Both have struggled to determine the point where. nonparticipation in a conflict actually becomes. an expression of political
85 von Sternberg, supra note 78, at 2 n.9.

86 Id. at 3. See also Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985) (a mere
threat to the asylum-seeker's life or freedom will only constitute "persecution" under the
Refugee Act if there is a clear indication that the basis for the threat is related to one of the
statute's factors).
87 Id.
88 See, e.g., Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285, 286-87 (5th Cir. 1987) (asylum
seeker who had witnessed a violent crime involving rape and murder in her home country
and had been threatened by the perpetrator with death if she revealed his identity did not
sufficiently establish political persecution to qualify as a refugee).
89 von Sternberg, supra note 78, at 3.
90 This Note focuses on Ninth Circuit cases because the other circuits have not considered the issue in depth. The First, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have acknowledged
that neutrality can constitute political opinion in some circumstances, but have never
granted asylum on this basis. Arthur C. Helton, The Criteriafor Refugee Protectionand Asylum
in the United States, 433 PLI/LIT 205 (1992). See Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for
Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1298 (11 th Cir. 1990) (petitioner's fear of persecution by
guerrillas for being deserter is not "on account of" political opinion); Alvarez-Flores v.
INS, 909 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1990) (court declined to decide whether neutrality constituted
political opinion). As a result, the BIA, which applies the law of the circuit where the alien
resides, uses the neutrality doctrine only in Ninth Circuit cases.,
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opinion that is encompassed by the Refugee Act. Cases involving
forced recruitment by guerrillas sharply define each side's point of
view. 9 1
In general, the BIA has not been sympathetic to asylum seekers
who fear such recruitment, no matter how well-founded that fear
might be. 9 2 Matter of Maldonado-Cruz,93 decided in 1988, is the BIA's
leading case on this issue. 9 4 In 1983, guerrillas in El Salvador kidnapped Maldonado-Cruz and some of his friends.9 5 Several days
later, they forced Maldonado-Cruz to fight in an action against his
own village.9 6 During this operation, one of his friends was shot as
he tried to leave the guerrillas. 9 7 A few days after this incident, Maldonado-Cruz managed to escape, and he fled to his parents' house,
where he stayed for only a few hours before leaving for San Salvador.98 While waiting for a bus, he ran into some neighbors from his
village who told him that the guerrillas were looking for him.9 9 Nevertheless, he eventually made it to the United States. 0 0
Maldonado-Cruz sought asylum on two grounds: first, that the
guerrillas would either harm or kill him because of his desertion;
and second, that the government might punish him for his membership in the guerrilla forces.' 0 '
In denying Maldonado-Cruz's asylum application, the BIA said
that the general issue in such cases could usually be framed in this
way: "[W]hether the political implications underlying an alien's fear
of harm rise to the level of 'political opinion' within the meaning of
the statute or whether those conditions constitute the type of civil
strife outside the intended reach of the statute."' 1 2 The Board
looked to the guerrillas' motivation in this case and concluded the
persecution was not political and therefore was outside the Refugee
Act's scope.' 0 3 "In analyzing a claim of persecution made in the
91 In contrast, the BIA and the courts have uniformly held that forced conscription by
a government does not constitute political persecution. A sovereign government has the
right to draft its citizens into the military, and a person fleeing from such a draft will not be
granted asylum. Matter of Vigil, Interim Decision 3050, at 578 (BIA 1988).
92 von Sternberg, supra note 78, at 13.
93 Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, Interim Decision 3041 (BIA 1988).
94 When the Ninth Circuit got a chance to hear Maldonado-Cruz's claim, it reversed
the INS' withholding of deportation. The Court said: "We hold that Maldonado's fear of
persecution by the guerrillas was based on political opinion. The guerrillas are a political
entity. Maldonado's refusal to join them was a manifestation of his neutrality, which is a
recognized political opinion." Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th. Cir.
1989).
95 Matter of Maldonado-Cruz, Interim Decision 3041, at 511.
96 Id.
97
98
99
100

Id.
Id.

I01

Id.

Id.
Id.

102 Id. at 512 (quoting Campos-Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987)).

10s Id. at 516-17.
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context of a civil war, it is necessary to look to the motivation of the
group threatening harm," the BIA wrote.10 4 "Even though guerrillas may have the political strategy of overthrowing the government
by military means, this does not mean that they cannot have objectives within that political strategy which are attained by acts of violence, but whose motivation is not related to any desire to
0 5
persecute."
Persecution under the Refugee Act only occurs where the aggressor has opinions that conflict with those of the victim, and where
the aggressor acts against the victim because he or she cannot tolerate that conflict, the Board explained. 10 6
The BIA concluded that the guerrillas were merely trying to discipline Maldonado-Cruz; their actions were those of survival, not of
persecution.' 07 "The guerrillas need military units to operate
against the government," the BIA reasoned.' 0 8 "To keep them as
cohesive fighting units they must impose discipline; and an important form of discipline, common to military or para-military organizations alike, is the punishment of deserters."' 0 9
The Board noted that there was no evidence that the guerrillas
found anything offensive in Maldonado-Cruz's political opinions or
actions." 0 "The nature of the respondent's initial encounter with
the guerrillas is important because it reveals that he was not seen as
an object of hatred.... [T]hey took him into their band because he
was of use to them."" 'l
The BIA's reasoning in Maldonado-Cruz foreshadows that of the
Supreme Court four years later in INS v. Elias-Zacarias,in which the
Court also concluded that the guerrillas' general political purpose is
irrelevant." 2 If they want to harm the asylum seeker simply as part
of the day-to-day operations of their organization with no concern for the victim's political beliefs - then their actions will not be
considered political persecution in the statutory sense.
The BIA decided Matter of Vigil 113 a few months after MaldonadoCruz and reiterated its opinion that forced recruitment does not constitute political persecution under the Refugee Act." 1 4 The applicant
told the Board that he had a generalized fear of being forced into the
guerrilla army in El Salvador and therefore was being persecuted for
104
105
106
107
108
109
lbO

Id. at 513.
Id.
Id. at 516.
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 514.

Id. at 513-14.
112 Elias-Zacarias, 112 S.Ct. at 816.
''I

113 Matter of Vigil, Interim Decision 3050 (BIA 1988).
'14
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his desire to remain neutral.'15 On the way to school one morning
in 1979, he saw the body of a young man who had been beheaded." 16
It was then that he decided to remain neutral in the civil war. 1 7 On
another occasion, friends told him that the guerrillas had come to a
soccer game and had forced some of the participants to join their
ranks."I8 Finally, the applicant testified that there had been a street
fight in his home town in 1984 between the government and the
guerrillas." 19 The skirmish lasted eight hours, during which time the
120
applicant hid under his bed.
In rejecting the asylum application, the Board used identical
reasoning as in Maldonado-Cruz. In general, guerrillas forcibly recruit
young Salvadoran males, the Board said. 12 1 Such recruitment does
not constitute political persecution because the young men are not
being singled out for their political beliefs.' 22 "We do not view the
guerrillas' interest in such persons, where the guerrillas' interest in
the person is clearly limited to recruitment, to amount to 'persecu23
tion' within the meaning of the Act."'
The Board placed great importance on the fact that the applicant had never expressed his desire to remain neutral to anyone in El
Salvador. 124 Instead, he had kept quiet. This made his claim much
weaker than Maldonado-Cruz's, but it gave the Board a chance to
underscore the need for affirmative action to win a neutrality claim.
"The respondent was not threatened by the guerrillas or the Gov2 5
ernment because of his neutrality opinion," the Board said.'
"There is no indication in the record that he ever had any direct
126
contact with the guerrilla or government forces in El Salvador."'
These cases illustrate the BIA's approach to forced recruitment.
The Board requires that there be "a direct causal connection" be12 7
tween the victim's neutrality and the persecutor's motivation.
"[I]f the persecutor's incentive is not to punish the applicantfor his
28
neutrality, then the claim must fail."'
The Ninth Circuit takes a more liberal approach and holds that
resistance to forced conscription by guerrillas can implicate the Ref115 Id. at 577.
116 Id. at 575.
117 Id.
118 Id.
''9 Id.

120 Id. at 576.
121 Id. at 577.
122 Id.

123 Id. at 557-78 (footnote omitted).
124 Id. at 577.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 von Sternberg, supra note 78, at 34.
128 Id.
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ugee Act in certain circumstances. Bolanos-Hemandez v. INS 129 is the
leading case on the issue. Espectacion Bolanos-Hernandez lived in
El Salvador before fleeing to the United States in 1982.130 For two
years, he was a member of a right-wing party.' 3 ' He also served in
the army and had been a member of Escolta Militia, a civilian police
squad that guards against guerrillas.' 3 2 Because of his membership
in these organizations, the guerrillas thought Bolanos-Hernandez
would be valuable to them.' 3 3 They wanted him to help them infiltrate the government. 13 4 When he refused, they threatened to kill
him.' 3 5 The guerrillas killed five of Bolanos-Hernandez's friends
and also threatened his brother. 13 6 Believing he might be the next
to die, Bolanos-Hernandez left the country eight days later. 13 7 The
government conceded that Bolanos-Hernandez made a commitment
to remain neutral in the civil war, but nevertheless maintained that
he should not be granted asylum.' 3 8 The Court of Appeals had to
decide whether this neutrality was an expression of political opinion.
In ruling in Bolanos-Hernandez's favor, the court took a common
sense approach: "Because he refused to join their cause and infiltrate the government on their behalf, the guerrillas are likely to consider him a political opponent, just as they would if he had spoken
39
out publicly in opposition to their cause or tactics."'
The court said it was "difficult to follow" the government's reasoning.14 0 "The government contends that Bolanos' decision to remain politically neutral is not a political choice. There is nothing in
the record to support this contention."'14 1 Neutrality is not apolitical, the court stated. 14 2 "Just as a nation's decision to remain neutral
is a political one, . . . so is an individual's. When a person is aware of
contending political forces and affirmatively chooses not to join any
43
faction, that choice is a political one."'
The Court of Appeals chastised the government for questioning
Bolanos-Hernandez's reasons for remaining neutral, calling such an
inquiry "improper."'' 4 4 Political choices often have non-political
129 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
Is0 Id. at 1280.
131
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roots, the court noted. 14 5 "A decision to join a particular political
party may, for example, be made to curry favor, gain social acceptability, advance one's career, or obtain access to money or positions
of power."' 146 The court added, "[h]owever, the reasons underlying
an individual's political choice are of no significance for purposes of
[the Refugee Act] and the government may not inquire into them.
Whatever the motivation, an individual's choice, once made, constitutes, for better or for worse, a manifestation of political
47
opinion."1

The court looked at the facts and decided that Bolanos-Hernandez's choice brought him within the parameters of the Refugee
Act. "Bolanos was quite aware of the political situation. He had severed his ties to the right-wing organizations with which he had been
affiliated," the court said. 14 8 "However, he subsequently refused to
join the guerrillas despite their threats to his life. By choosing neutrality and refusing to join a particular political faction, Bolanos expressed his opinion and took a political stance."' 4 9 These actions
were "as much an affirmative expression of a political opinion as is
150
joining a side, or speaking out for or against a side."'
In Argueta v. INS, 15 ' the Ninth Circuit ruled that the asylum
seeker does not even have to show that he overtly manifested his
neutrality. Argueta was a native of El Salvador who testified that four
men threatened him at his home because they thought he was a
member of a guerrilla organization.1 5 2 They told him he would disappear if he did not leave the country.' 55 The next day, a close
friend of his was taken away by the same four men. 154 Later, Argueta
55
found his friend's body - he had been tortured and killed.'
156
Argueta left his country the next day.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Argueta established his political opinion when he testified at his hearing to his lack of agreement
with, support for, or help to either side.' 5 7 The court concluded:
It is apparent the [immigration judge] erroneously assumed that it
was necessary for Argueta to prove his allegiance to a particular
political faction. Argueta's testimony indicated that he had affirmatively chosen to remain politically neutral. We therefore conclude
145 Id. at 1286-87.
146 Id. at 1287.
147 Id.(emphasis added).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.

1S 759 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985).
152 Id.at 1395.
153 Id.

154 Id. at 1395-96.
155 Id.at 1396.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 1397 n.3.
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that Argueta's decision
5 8 to remain neutral constituted an expression
of political opinion.'
In Arteaga v. INS, 159 a young Salvadoran sought asylum because
the guerrillas in his country had threatened him with conscription.
When he refused to join them, asserting his desire to remain neutral,
the guerrillas told him: "Even if you don't come, we'll get you."' 60
The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of granting asylum, saying it "[was]
not relevant that the guerrillas may have been interested in conscripting Arteaga to fill their ranks rather than to 'punish' Arteaga's
neutrality."'61 Thus, the court concluded, "[cilearly forced recruitment into the war against the government is politically
62
motivated."1
Thus, the Ninth Circuit established a broader test for this type of
case than had the BIA. Bolanos-Hernandez and its progeny allowed an
asylum claim where: "(A) the applicant has undertaken some overt
act from which neutrality opinion can be inferred; and (B) the persecutor wishes to punish the applicant because of this overt act, irre163
spective of why the applicant has acted as he has."'
IV.

Significance of Case

In ruling against Elias-Zacarias, the Supreme Court put itself directly in line with the BIA decisions. A choice to not fight for either
side in a civil war is no longer enough to qualify an applicant for
refugee status; the asylum seeker must show first that he or she has
affirmatively taken a position of neutrality and second that the persecution is a direct result of that neutrality (and not some other policy
reason such as the guerrillas' need to recruit soldiers). The Court's
decision means that men like Maldonado-Cruz and Elias-Zacarias
must affirmatively express their political views rather than simply refuse to join in the war. The Court, however, does not suggest how
such men are to do this and still remain alive to eventually apply for
asylum. Instead, it forces people to choose one side or the other in
order to have what it perceives to be a valid form of political
expression.
V.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's rationale that Elias-Zacarias' neutrality
could not be political opinion because it was motivated by fear is not
realistic. "The record in the present case not only failed to show a
political motive on Elias-Zacarias' part; it showed the opposite," JusId. at 1397.
836 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1232 n.8.
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tice Scalia wrote. 164 "He testified that he refused to join the guerrillas because he was afraid the government would retaliate against him
and his family if he did so."'1 6 5 Under the Court's reasoning, the

only form of political opinion protected by the statute would be a
pure form - the sort that might exist in a vacuum. For if the opinion
were motivated by anything other than political reasoning, then it
would not be the sort that would fall within the Refugee Act. In the
real world, however, it is not such a simple thing to divorce politics
from life. Virtually all forms of political expression have some sort
of underlying, non-political motive. A person who supports a political candidate may do so because he or she thinks the candidate will
bring jobs to the area or cut taxes. Would the Court say that this
support was not really political because it was rooted in economic
considerations? Someone may work for a political candidate, not
because he or she believes in the candidate's views, but because it
will help a career or mean more power. If such a person were persecuted for working for that candidate, would the Court not protect
him or her simply because these political actions weren't really
"political" after all?
In concluding that the guerrilla's persecution was not politically
motivated, the Court tried to draw a line between persecuting someone for not joining a side (which would not be protected under EliasZacarias) and persecuting someone specifically because of his neutrality (which, in theory, might be). Realistically, this line does not exist.
What is neutrality if it is not refusing to fight on either side of a civil
war? Nevertheless, the Court held that the guerrilla's threats were
not politically motivated because they were merely trying to fill their
ranks. 166 This is a fallacy. The guerrillas were trying to force EliasZacarias to abandon his neutrality - to abandon his political opinion. Quite simply, this is political persecution.
In addition to being unrealistic, the Court passed down a decision that has policy implications that contravene congressional intent. One of the goals of the Refugee Act was to eradicate
immigration restrictions based on geography. 16 7 Unfortunately for
many Latin Americans, however, this historically has not been the
case. American immigration policy seems to fluctuate with American
foreign policy. For example, in the first three quarters of 1987, the
approval rate for asylum cases filed with the INS was as follows: Nicaragua, 83.9 percent; Iran, 67.4 percent; Romania, 59.7 percent, Afghanistan, 26.2 percent; Guatemala, 3.8 percent, and El Salvador,
3.6 percent.' 6 8 In 1984, the INS approved 66 percent of the Iranian
164 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S.Ct. 812, 816 (1992).
165
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requests and 49 percent of the Polish requests, but only two percent
of the El Salvadoran requests. 169 As Judge Winter of the Fourth Circuit noted, "Even assuming that the . . . discrepancy may be ex-

plained partially by the fact that more applicants (and more meritless
claims) come from El Salvador and other Latin American countries,
these statistics suggest
an impermissible infusion of ideology into the
170
asylum process."'
The Court's holding in this case can only exacerbate this problem by making it virtually impossible for people fleeing Latin
America to meet the refugee standard.' 7 ' Commentator Arthur C.
Helton pointed out, "[T]he specific-intent requirement that the
[C]ourt in Elias-Zacarias implied from the statute may narrow the
scope of refugee protection unduly. Such an intent may be difficult
to establish, even indirectly from the circumstances, if other plausible objectives could be attributed to the persecutor - for example,
72
raising military forces or enforcing discipline in guerrilla groups."1
A significant number of countries are enmeshed in this type of civil
173
unrest, a great many of them in Central America.
The Court's holding also ignores the Refugee Act's human
rights directive. Legislative history shows that both the House and
the Senate wanted a humanitarian approach to refugee admissions.' 74 Congress hoped that "the plight of the refugees themselves, as
opposed to national origins or political considerations, should be
paramount in determining which refugees are to be admitted to the
75
United States."'
Because it recognized the human element of these neutrality
cases, the decisions of the Ninth Circuit better served congressional
intent. With its common sense approach to political opinion, the appellate court accepted that politics may be based on any range of
human emotions. ' 76 Add fear from a threat by a guerrilla group that
practices forced recruitment, and the result could very well reach the
169 Id. (Winter, J., dissenting)
170 Id. (Winter, J., dissenting).
171 Immigration rights groups criticized the decision, saying that the case could affect
thousands of refugees from a number of countries, including Guatemala, El Salvador, Sri
Lanka and Afghanistan. Arthur C. Helton, director of the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, said that the ruling "subverts the protective purposes of the Refugee Act of 1980."
Ruth Marcus,Justices Deny Asylum to Guatemalan Refugee, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1992, at A8.
172 Arthur C. Helton,Justices Seem to Give INS the Benefit of the Doubt, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 20,
1992.
173 These countries include Angola, Ethiopia, Namibia, Uganda, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Libya. von Sternberg, supra note
78, at 4 n.16.
174 Tahl Tyson, Comment, The Refugee Act of 1980: Suggested Reforms in the Overseas Refugee Program to SafeguardHumanitarianConcernsfrom Competing Interests, 65 WASH. L. REv. 921,
926 (1990).
175 Id. (quoting HOUSE REPORT ON THE REFUGEE AcT OF 1979, H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th
Coni, 1st Sess. 13 (1979) (emphasis added)).
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level of political persecution. As Judge Reinhardt said in BolanosHernandez,
It should be obvious that the significance of a specific threat to an
individual's life or freedom is not lessened by the fact that the individual resides in a country where the lives and freedom of a large
number of persons are threatened. If anything .. .that fact may
make the threat more serious or credible.177

That court noted that, in the end, political motive in such countries
really does not matter. "Because [Bolanos-Hernandez] refused to
join their cause.., the guerrillas are likely to consider him a political
opponent, just as they would if he had spoken out publicly in opposi-

1 78
tion to their cause or tactics."
Allowing Elias-Zacarias refugee status would not have created a

dangerous situation wherein all people fleeing forced recruitment
would be allowed into the United States.1 79 The Attorney General's
discretion would continue to be a check on such a problem. Indeed,
Congress intended for this to be so:
The [House] committee carefully considered arguments that the
new definition might expand the numbers of refugees eligible to
come to the United States and force substantially greater refugee
admissions than the country could absorb. However, merely because an individual or group comes within the defignition will not
guarantee resettlement.... Congress has assigned to the Attorney
General and his delegates the task of making those hard individualized decisions; although Congress could have crafted a narrower
definition, it chose to authorize the Attorney General to determine
which, if any, eligible refugees should be denied asylum. 180
The countries of Central America are mired in civil wars. Often,
people are forced to do more than simply stand by and let the fighting continue around them. Brought face-to-face with political reality
either by government oppression or guerrilla forced recruitment,
they are given an impossible choice between two violent factions.
Many choose to not choose and flee the country. These are the people whom the Supreme Court has left in limbo: those who would
choose peace over violence, life over death.
AMY DELPO
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179 The Bush administration had warned that allowing Elias-Zacarias to win would
lead to a flood of refugees from countries enmeshed in civil wars. Marcus, supra note 171.
180 INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 817 n.4 (1992) (Stevens, J.,dissenting) (quoting INS v. Cadoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 444-45 (1987)).

